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Abstract
We give an axiomatic characterization of the Time-Preference Nash Solution, a bargaining
solution that is applied when the underlying preferences are deﬁned over streams of physical
outcomes.This bargaining solution is similar to the ordinal Nash solution introduced by
Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson (1992), but it gives a diﬀerent prediction when the set of
physical outcomes is a set of lotteries.JEL Classiﬁcation, C72, C78.
Keywords: Bargaining, ordinal Nash solution.
1 Introduction
In his seminal paper, Nash (1950) models a bargaining situation by concentrating on the set of
available utility pairs and abstracting away from most of the details of the underlying environ-
ment.Thus the primitives of a bargaining problem consist of a set, S, of feasible utility pairs
and a disagreement point in it.The idea is that the set S is induced by the lotteries over an
underlying set of physical outcomes which, for the purposes of the analysis, can be abstracted
away.Within this model Nash (1950) provides an axiomatic characterization of what is now the
widely known Nash bargaining solution.Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson (1992) (RST in the
sequel) recast the bargaining problem into the underlying set of physical alternatives and give
an axiomatization of what is known as the ordinal Nash bargaining solution.This solution has
a very natural interpretation and has the interesting property that when risk preferences satisfy
the expected utility axioms, it induces the standard Nash bargaining solution of the induced bar-
gaining problem.This property justiﬁes the proper name in the solution’s appellation.Dealing
with the question of existence and uniqueness, Hanany and Safra (2000) identify a large family
of preferences within which the set of Nash outcomes is nonempty.Further, they show that if
a preference relation is not in this family, then there is a preference relation in the family such
that the corresponding bargaining problem has no Nash outcome.Burgos, Grant, and Kajii
1Nir Dagan, independent web developer, www.nirdagan.com. Email: nir@nirdagan.com.
2Department of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames IA 50011, USA, and Hebrew University, Jerusalem
91905, Israel. E-mail: oscar@volij.co.il
3Department of Economics, Hebrew University, Jerusalem 91905, Israel. E-mail: mseyal@mscc.huji.ac.il(2001) analyze an extensive form bargaining game whose subgame perfect equilibrium outcome
converges to the ordinal Nash outcome as the risk of breakdown in negotiations tends to 0.
As Grant and Kajii (1995) (henceforth GK) note, although the characterizing properties used
in RST are satisﬁed over a class that contains the expected utility preferences, they are not
satisﬁed by a wide variety of interesting non-expected utility preferences.GK partially solve
this problem by giving an alternative characterization of the ordinal Nash bargaining solution
that holds for a class of preferences that contains the class covered by RST’s assumptions.More
signiﬁcantly, GK show that every ordinal bargaining problem in that class, and not only those that
are deﬁned by expected utility preferences), induces a standard (cardinal) problem.Further, the
ordinal Nash bargaining solution induces the standard Nash bargaining solution in the induced
cardinal problems.As GK admit, the class of preferences for which their construction works is
very restrictive.Further, one can argue that the GK construction does not yield the most natural
set of utility pairs.To make the point clear, consider the following example, which is based on
Example 1 in Grant and Kajii (1995).
Example 1 Two individuals bargain over one unit of a single commodity (money).Any non-
negative division of the single commodity is feasible if both agents agree, otherwise they get 0.
As a result, the set of physical outcomes is
X = {(x1,x 2):x1 + x2 ≤ 1,x 1,x 2 ≥ 0},
and the disagreement physical outcome is
D =( 0 ,0).
We shall assume that the bargainers are not constrained to agree on deterministic outcomes, but
they can agree upon any lottery over elements of X.A lottery,  , is a probability measure on
the Borel sets of X.The set of lotteries will be denoted by L.Assume that both bargainers’
preferences over risky prospects satisfy the axioms of Yaari’s (1987) dual theory of choice under





 (t)]αi dt i =1 ,2, (1)
where for i =1 ,2, αi > 1a n dGi
  is the decumulative distribution function of the i’s payoﬀs.
Given y ∈ X and p ∈ [0,1 ] ,w ed e n o t eb y[ y,p] the simple lottery that awards y with
probability p and (0,0) otherwise.A Nash outcome (see Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson (1992))
is an outcome x∗ ∈ X such that for all p ∈ [0,1] and for all y ∈ X,
Ui([p;y]) >U i(x∗) ⇒ Uj([p;x∗]) >U j(y) i  = j, i,j =1 ,2. (2)
2The interpretation of (2) is simple: if an agent is willing to run a risk of a breakdown in nego-
tiations and get the outcome y with probability p instead of getting x∗ with certainty, then the
other agent is willing to run the same risk to get x∗ with probability p instead of getting y with
certainty.In our case condition 2 reduces to
pαiyi >x ∗
i ⇒ pαjx∗
j >y j ,i = j, i,j =1 ,2.
As GK show, the only Nash outcome in this situation is given by




2 :( x1,x 2) ∈ X}.
Let’s now apply the standard Nash bargaining solution to our bargaining situation.For this
purpose we need ﬁrst to translate the bargaining situation into the utility space and deﬁne the
corresponding bargaining problem  S,d .A natural choice of the utility possibilities set is given
by the set of all utility pairs that can be achieved by means of a feasible lottery, namely
S = {(U1( ),U 2( )) :   ∈L }
and the corresponding disagreement point is d =( 0 ,0).It is not diﬃcult to see that in our case
S =c o {(0,0),(1,0),(0,1)}, and therefore the Nash bargaining solution picks (1
2, 1
2), a utility pair
that can be implemented only by the agreement x =( 1
2, 1
2) ∈ X.As we can see, RST and Nash’s
solutions give diﬀerent outcomes.
GK argue that our set S is not the relevant set of utility pairs.With a very compelling
argument they propose that the relevant utilities possibilities set is the following one:
S  = {(s1,s 2):∃(x1,x 2) ∈ X, si ≤ x
1/αi
i ,i=1 ,2}.
Indeed, when we apply the Nash bargaining solution to  S ,0 , we get the utility pair that
corresponds to RST’s solution.Still, our set S seems to be very natural and the question is
whether there is a solution concept deﬁned over a class of ordinal problems, that induces the
Nash bargaining solution over our set S.
In order to answer this question, we can ﬁnd a hint in Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky
(1986).There it is argued that there are two ways of constructing a cardinal bargaining problem
out of a given set of physical outcomes, depending on whether risk- of time-preferences are
involved.Once the appropriate bargaining problem is built, the solution that selects the point at
which the Nash product is maximized is called the standard Nash solution or the time-preference
Nash solution, respectively.Let’s see now what happens if we add a time dimension to the
problem in Example 1.
3Example 1 (continued):L e tT =[ 0 ,∞) be the time axis and assume that the agents have
preferences over L×T that can be represented by the following utility functions:
δtUi( ),i =1 ,2
where δ ∈ (0,1).These preferences exhibit impatience in the sense that any given lottery is
better sooner than later.Deﬁne  ∗ to be a time-preference Nash outcome if for all t ∈ T and for
all   ∈Lwe have
δtUi( ) >U i( ∗) ⇒ δtUj( ∗) >U j( ),i  = j, i,j =1 ,2. (3)
The interpretation of (3) is simple.If an agent prefers to wait a period of length t in order to
get a lottery   rather than getting  ∗ immediately, then the other agent prefers to insist on  ∗
for the same lapse of time rather than agreeing to   immediately.As will be shown in a later
section, the only time-preference Nash outcome in our bargaining situation is the certain division
x =( 1
2, 1
2) ∈ X, the same one obtained within the cardinal approach when applied to the set S.
The purpose of this paper is to give an axiomatic characterization of the rule that assigns
the time-preference Nash outcome to each bargaining problem.The idea is analogous to the one
applied by RST.The primitives of RST’s model is an abstract set X of physical alternatives, and
a status-quo outcome D ∈ X.RST’s aim is to deﬁne a solution concept F that maps each pair
of preference relations to a unique outcome in X which has some relation to the cardinal Nash
bargaining solution.The problem is that the preference relations over the set X are not enough
to perform this task.As a result, RST consider extensions of the preferences over X to the set
of lotteries over X.In other words, they enlarge the model to allow for lotteries whose outcomes
are elements of X, and in this way they are able to deﬁne a solution concept F that, while it
is deﬁned over pairs of risk preferences, still selects an element of X, namely a non-degenerate
lottery.Our strategy diﬀers from RST’s in that we do not extend the agents’ preferences over X
to risk preferences but to time preferences.In other words, our solution concept will take a pair
of preferences over time-combinations of elements of X and still return an element of X, namely
an immediate agreement.
There are some advantages in our characterization of the time-preference Nash solution.The
main advantage is that when the basic set of physical alternatives is a set of lotteries, no special
assumptions need to be made about the agents’ risk preferences.Therefore all of the widely used
non-expected utility preferences are, in principle, covered.
In principle, an axiomatization of the time-preference Nash solution could be done by per-
forming a mechanic adaptation of the axioms used in RST or in GK.But our characterization
uses, along with some standard axioms, axioms that are related to time.One axiom requires
4that if one agent becomes more impatient in some well-deﬁned sense, and the other becomes less
impatient, then the solution should change in favor of the agent that became more patient.The
other axiom has a ﬂavor of subgame perfection.At any particular but arbitrary point in time
t, the players have the choice of disagreeing for ever, but still the solution picks an agreement
x.Consider a situation where if there is no agreement by time t to accept the solution’s recom-
mendation.It is as if the disagreement point, instead of being disagreement for ever, consisted
of agreement x at time t.The axiom requires from a solution to chose the same outcome x both
if the status quo is disagreement for ever or if it is agreeing to x at time t.
As should be clear from Example 1, RST’s ordinal Nash solution and the time-preference
Nash solutions, when applied to a set of lotteries, give diﬀerent predictions.In fact, as Volij and
Winter (1999) show, they even have very diﬀerent comparative statics properties (see also Safra
and Zilcha (1993) for related results).In particular, risk aversion plays no role in our example
when the time-preference Nash solution is applied while risk aversion has an inﬂuence when RST’s
ordinal Nash solution is applied.
2 The Model
Let X be a set of physical alternatives and let d be an element of X.The set X is supposed to
be a non empty compact subset of a vector space and d represents the status-quo outcome.Let
T =[ 0 ,∞) be the time axis.An agreement is a function x : T → X that determines the physical
outcome enforced at every point in time.An elementary agreement is a constant agreement,
namely, a function x such that x(t)=¯ x for some ¯ x ∈ X.We shall identify the set of elementary
agreements with X.Let x and y be two agreements and let τ be a point in time.We denote by




x(t − τ)i f t ≥ τ.
That is, [yτx] postpones x until τ and coincides with y for 0 until τ.We say that [ yτx]i satime
combination of x and y.Although an agreement is any evolution of physical outcomes over time,
for simplicity we shall restrict attention to agreements of the form [x,τy] where both x and y are
elementary agreements.Therefore, a feasible agreement [ yτx] can be interpreted as outcome y
until time τ, and outcome x from τ on.Denote by X the set of feasible agreements.
Let δ ∈ (0,1).In this paper we shall restrict attention to preferences over X that, for some






5which, given our restriction to X, can be written as
U(yτz)=( 1− e−deltaτ)u(y)+e−δτu(z).
The number δ, which will be ﬁxed throughout the analysis, is the agents’ common discount factor.
The requrement that u(x) ≥ u(d) means that the worst posible outcome is d forever.Note that
u : X → I R and v : X → I R represent the same preferences over X, if and only if v = au+b for all
a>0 and for all b.Denote by P the set of continuous real functions on X such that u(x) ≥ u(d),
for all x ∈ X.Let u1 and u2 be a pair of functions in P.We say that an outcome x ∈ X is
eﬃcient if there is no outcome y ∈ X with ui(y) >u i(x)f o rb o t hi =1 ,2.
Deﬁnition 1 A negotiation problem i sap a i r (u1,u 2),D  where (u1,u 2) is a pair of utility
functions in P and D ∈ X is a status-quo agreement, which is not eﬃcient.
We use the expression negotiation problem to denote a pair  (u1,u 2),D  because we want to
reserve bargaining problem to denote the problems analized by Nash (1950).The interpretation
of a negotiation problem is as follows: ui represents the time-preference of agent i,a n dD is the
outcome that represents disagreement for ever.We shall sometimes denote a negotiation problem
B =  (u1,u 2),D  by  u,D , where u : X → IR 2 is deﬁned by u(x)=( u1(x),u 2(x)).Further, for
a subset Y ⊆ X, u(Y )={s ∈ IR 2 : ∃x ∈ Y such that s = u(x)} is the image of Y under u.
Let B =  u,D  be a negotiation problem.An outcome x ∈ X is individually rational if
u(x) ≥ u(D).It is strongly individually rational if u(x) >u (D).We denote by IR(B) the set of
individually rational agreements.
Deﬁnition 2 Let B =  (u1,u 2),D  be a negotiation problem.A Nash agreement is an individu-
ally rational outcome x∗ ∈I R (B) such that there is no agent i,f o ri =1 ,2, time τ and outcome
y ∈I R (B) such that Ui([Dτy]) >u i(x∗)a n duj(y) >U j([Dτx∗]).
A Nash agreement is the time-preference version of RST’s ordinal Nash outcome.The inter-
pretation is simple: if one agent would rather wait for τ time-units to get y than agreeing to x∗
immediately, then the other agent would rather wait for the same lapse of time to get x∗ than
agreeing on y immediately.
The following lemma shows that a Nash agreement is eﬃcient and strongly individually ra-
tional and it will be useful in the Nash agreement’s cardinal characterization.
Lemma 1 Let B =  u,D  be a negotiation problem and let x∗ be a Nash agreement of B.Then
x∗ is eﬃcient and strongly individually rational.
6Proof : It follows directly from the deﬁnition that a Nash agreement cannot be ineﬃcient.
Assume now that for some i, ui(x∗)=ui(D).Since D is not eﬃcient, there is an outcome
y ∈ X such that uj(y) >u j(D)f o rj =1 ,2.Therefore, for all τ we have Ui([Dτy]) >u i(x∗).
On the other hand, since limt→∞ Uj([Dtx∗]) = uj(D), there must be a τ big enough such that
uj(y) >U j([Dτx∗]).Consequently x∗ cannot be a Nash agreement. ✷
We shall restrict attention to negotiation problems that satisfy the following properties:
Convexity: A negotiation problem  u,D  is convex if for all x ∈Xthere is an elementary
agreement z ∈ X such that ui(z)=Ui(x)f o ri =1 ,2.
Parsimony: A negotiation problem  u,D  is parsimonious if x = y whenever u(x)=u(y).
Free disposal: A negotiation problem B =  (u1,u 2),D  satisﬁes free disposal if for all x ∈
IR(B), there are z1 and z2 in IR(B) such that ui(zi)=ui(x)a n dui(zj)=ui(d)f o r
i =1 ,2a n dj  = i.
Convexity says that for every agreement there is a constant immediate agreement that is
utility equivalent.It is not an innocuous assumption that allows us to restrict attention to
constant immediate agreements.Parsimony allows us to get rid of irrelevant multiplicity and free
disposal will allow us to deal with a comprehensive feasible set.Parsimony and Free disposal are
mainly simplifying assumptions.We believe that they are not crucial for our results.
Denote by N the set of all convex, parsimonious negotiation problems that satisfy free dis-
posal.
The following useful result is standard.
Lemma 2 Let B =  (u1,u 2),D  be a negotiation problem.The elementary agreement x∗ is a
Nash agreement if and only if it solves
max
x∈IR(B)
(u1(x) − u1(D))(u2(x) − u2(D)). (5)
Proof :L e t x∗ ∈I R (B) and assume there exists an agent i, outcome y ∈I R (B) and time τ
such that
Ui([Dτy]) >u i(x∗)a n duj(y) >U j([Dτx∗]). (6)
This means
(1 − e−δτ)ui(D)+e−δτui(y) >u i(x∗)a n duj(y) > (1 − e−δτ)ui(D)+e−δτui(x∗).
7Rearranging,
e−δτ(ui(y) − ui(D)) >u i(x∗) − ui(D)a n duj(y) − uj(D) >e −δτ(uj(x∗) − uj(D)).
Multiplying both inequalities,
e−δτ(ui(y) − ui(D))(uj(y) − uj(D)) >e −δτ(uj(x∗) − uj(D))(ui(x∗) − ui(D))
which means that x∗ is not a solution to (5).
Conversely, assume that x∗ is not a solution to (5).If x∗ is not strongly individually rational,
then by Lemma 1 x∗ is not a Nash outcome.If x∗ is strongly individually rational, then ui(x∗) >








ui(y) − ui(D) >e −δτ(ui(x∗) − ui(D))
and
e−δτ(uj(y) − uj(D)) >u j(x∗) − uj(D).
This means
ui(y) > (1 − e−δτ)ui(D)+e−δτui(x∗)
uj(x∗) < (1 − e−δτ)uj(D)+e−δτuj(y).
Namely x∗ is not a Nash outcome. ✷
As a corollary of the previous Lemma 2 we get the following:
Proposition 1 Let B =  u,D  be a negotiation problem in B.Then a Nash agreement exists.
Further, if B is convex and parsimonious, the Nash agreement is unique.
Proof : Assume without loss of generality that u1(D)=u2(D) = 0.Since u1 and u2 are
continuous functions and X is a compact set, the problem deﬁned in (5) has a solution.By
Lemma 2 there is a Nash outcome x.Assume that y is another Nash outcome.Let τ>0
and consider the simple agreement [yτx].Since the problem is convex, there is an elementary
agreement z ∈ X such that ui(z)=Ui([yτx]), for i =1 ,2.Then we must have
u1(z)u2(z) ≥ ((1 − e−δτ)u1(y)+e−δτu1(x))((1 − e−δτ)u2(y)+e−δτu2(x))
≥ u1(x)u2(x)=u1(y)u2(y)
8where the inequlaity follows from the strict quasi-concavity of the function f(v1,v 2)=v1v2.
Further, the inequality is strict unless x and y are utility equivalent.But since x and y are Nash
outcomes, we must have equality, which implies that they are utility equivalent.But since B is
parsimonious, x = y. ✷
A negotiation solution is a function F : N→X that assigns an outcome to each negotiation
problem.
Given Proposition 1, the following is a well-deﬁned solution.
Deﬁnition 3 The time-preference Nash solution is the solution that assigns to each negotiation
problem in N, its time-preference Nash outcome.
3 Characterization
3.1 The axioms
We now turn to the axiomatic characterization of the time-preference Nash solution.We are
interested in appealing properties that are also adequate for our framework of time-contingent
agreements.We start with the two standard axioms of eﬃciency and symmetry.
EFF: A negotiation solution F satisﬁes eﬃciency if for all B ∈N, F(B) is eﬃcient.
A negotiation problem  (u1,u 2),D  is symmetric if there exists a bijection φ : X → X such
that
1. φ−1 = φ
2. φ(D)=D
3.for all x,y ∈ X and for all τ,τ  ∈ T, U1([Dτx]) >U 1([Dτ y]) ⇔ U2([Dτφ(x)]) >
U2([Dτ φ(y)]).
SYM: A negotiation solution F satisﬁes symmetry if for all symmetric problems B with sym-
metry function φ, F(B)=φ(F(B)).
Claim 1 The time-preference Nash solution satisﬁes symmetry.
Proof :L e t B =  (u1,u 2),D ∈Nbe a symmetric negotiation problem with symmetry function
φ and let x∗ be its time-preference Nash outcome.We must show that φ(x∗)=x∗.First note
that φ(x∗) ∈I R (B).Indeed, since x∗ ∈I R (B), we have that
u1(x∗) ≥ u1(D)a n du2(x∗) ≥ u2(D)
9which, since φ is a symmetry function, implies that
u2(φ(x∗)) ≥ u2(D)a n du1(φ(x∗)) ≥ u1(D).
Assume by contradiction that φ(x∗) is not a time-preference Nash outcome.Then there is y ∈
IR(B), i ∈{ 1,2} and τ ∈ T such that
Ui([Dτy]) >u i(φ(x∗)) and uj(y) >U i([Dτφ(x∗)]).
But since φ is a symmetry function we get
Uj([Dτφ(y)]) >u i(x∗)a n duj(φ(y)) >U i([Dτx∗])
which contradicts the fact that x∗ is a time-preference Nash outcome. ✷
We know that two functions u and u  represent the same preferences over X if one can be
obtained from the other by means of a positive aﬃne transformation.It would be reasonable
then to require that the solution be invariant to equivalent utility representations.In order to
state this requirement, we need the following deﬁnition.
Two negotiation problems B =  (u1,u 2),D  and B  =  (u 
1,u  
2),D  are equivalent if there are
αi > 0a n dβi,f o ri =1 ,2 such that u 
i = αiui + βi,f o ri =1 ,2.
INV: A negotiation solution F satisﬁes invariance if for all equivalent problems B =  (u1,u 2),D 
and B  =  (u 
1,u  
2),D , F(B)=F(B ).
We now present other axioms, some of which make use of the time-preference nature of the
problem.
INIRA: A negotiation solution F satisﬁes independence of non-individually rational outcomes
if for all pair of problems B =  u,D ,B  =  u ,D  in N such that
•I R (B)=IR(B )
• for all x,∈I R (B), u(x)=u (x)
we have F(B)=F(B ).
This axiom requires that the solution be dependent on the agents’ preference relations over the
individually rational outcomes only.It is easy to check the validity of the following:
Claim 2 The time-preference Nash solution satisﬁes INV and INIRA.
10Consider the negotiation problem  u,D  and assume the solution recommends the agreement
x∗. D here represents the outcome of disagreement forever.Suppose that the agents agree that if
they do not reach an agreement before time t, then the outcome will be x∗ from t on.In this case,
we can regard [Dtx∗] as the status-quo.The next axiom requires from a solution to recommend
the same outcome both when we consider D or [Dtx∗] as the disagreement outcome.
TFP: A negotiation solution F has the tree-folding property if for all negotiation problems
 u,D ,w eh a v et h a tF(u,D)=F(u,z) for all z ∈ X such that for some t ∈ T,
ui(z)=Ui([DtF(u,D)]).
Suppose the F(u,D) is the agreement proposed by the solution, then the axiom requires
that the same agreement be selected if the disagreement outcome D is replaced by a postponed
implementation of the agreement F(u,D).We call this axiom the tree folding property because
it is related the corresponding property of the Nash equilibrium concept of extensive form games.
Consider an extensive form game and ﬁx a Nash equilibrium σ in it.For every node n in the tree,
σ determines an outcome, z(n,σ), which is the outcome that would result if σ w a sp l a y e di nt h e
subgame that starts at node n.In particular, σ determines a Nash equilibrium outcome z(n0,σ),
where n0 denotes the root of the tree.Now, z(n0,σ) remains a Nash equilibrium outcome if
we replace any given node n by the terminal history z(n,σ).Needless to say, this “tree-folding
property” is also satisﬁed by the Subgame Perfect equilibrium concept, but we want to stress
that it is so basic that it is even satisﬁed by the Nash equilibrium concept.The outcome F(u,D)
in the TFP axiom, represents the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of some extensive form,
stationary bargaining game.The outcome DtF(u,D), on the other hand, represents the outcome
induced by the subgame perfect equilibrium for the subgames that start at time t.We know
that if we replaced each subgame that starts at t by the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome
DtF(u,D), then the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the amended game would remain
F(u,D).This is exactly what the TFP axiom wants to capture.
Claim 3 The time-preference Nash solution satisﬁes the tree-folding property.
Proof :L e t B =  (u1,u 2),D ∈Nbe a negotiation problem and let x∗ be its time-preference
Nash agreement.Then, by Lemma 2, x∗ solves
max
y∈IR(B)
(u1(y) − u1(D))(u2(y) − u2(D)).
Let z ∈ X and τ ∈ T be such that ui(z)=( 1− eδτ)ui(D)+e−δτui(x∗)f o r=1 ,2a n dl e t
B  =  (u1,u 2),z .By Peters and van Damme (1991) (Lemma 3. 2), x∗ solves
max
y∈IR(B)
(u1(y) − u1(z))(u2(y) − u2(z)).
11Therefore, by Lemma 2, x∗ is the time-preference Nash agreement of B . ✷
The next axiom compares two problems, B and B , with the same disagreement outcome.The
diﬀerence between the two problems is that when we go from B to B  one player becomes more
impatient and the second becomes less impatient.Denote by x and x  the outcomes recommended
by the a solution to B and B , respectively.The axiom requires from the solution that x  be
preferred to x by the agent who became more patient and that x be preferred to x  by the agent
who became more impatient.
IM: A negotiation solution F satisﬁes impatience monotonicity if the following condition holds:
whenever B =  u,D  and B  =  u ,D  are two negotiation problems such that
1. u(D)=u (D)a n du(F(B)) = u (F(B)).
2.for all x ∈ X,i fx is eﬃcient and individually rational in B so is x in B .
3.for all eﬃcient and individually rational points x,y ∈ X, ui(x) ≥ ui(y) if and only if
u 
i(x) ≥ u 
i(y), for i =1 ,2.
4.for some i =1 ,2a n dj =3− i
• if ui(F(B)) = Ui([Dτix]) then u 
i(F(B)) ≥ U 
i([Dτix])
• if uj(x)=Uj([DτjF(B)]) then U 
j([DτjF(B)]) ≥ u 
j(x).
then u 
i(F(B )) ≤ u 
i(F(B)).
Claim 4 The time-preference Nash solution satisﬁes impatience monotonicity.
Proof :L e t B =  (u1,u 2),D  and B  =  (u 
1,u  
2),D  be two negotiation problems that satisfy
the conditions of the axiom and let x∗ be the time-preference Nash outcome of B.Let x ∈ X
be an eﬃcient outcome such that u 
i(x) >u  
i(x∗).We shall show that x is not a time-preference
Nash outcome of B .By condition 3, ui(x) >u i(x∗), which by eﬃciency of the time-preference
Nash solution implies that uj(x) <u j(x∗).Again, by condition 3, u 
j(x) <u  
j(x∗).Now, since
ui(x) >u i(x∗), there is τ ∈ T such that
(1 − e−δτ)ui(D)+e−δτui(x)=ui(x∗).
By 4 and 1,
(1 − e−δτ)u 
i(D)+e−δτu 
i(x) ≤ ui(x∗).
Therefore, it follows from the above two inequalities that
12u 
i(x) − u 
i(D) ≤ ui(x) − ui(D).
Similarly, since u 
j(x) <u  









j(x∗) ≥ u 
j(x).
Therefore, it follows from the above two inequalities and 1 that
u 
j(x) − u 
j(D) ≤ uj(x) − u 
j(D).
Then we have that
(u 
1(x) − u 
1(D))(u 
2(x) − u 
2(D)) ≤ (u1(x) − u1(D))(u2(x) − u2(D))
< (u1(x∗) − u1(D))(u2(x∗) − u2(D))
=( u 
1(x∗) − u 
1(D))(u 
2(x∗) − u 
2(D)).
Therefore, by Lemma 2, x is not a time-preference Nash outcome of B . ✷
We are now ready to state our main result.
Theorem 1 A negotiation solution F : N→X satisﬁes eﬃciency, symmetry, invariance, in-
dependence of non-individually rational alternatives, the tree-folding property and impatience
monotonicity, if and only if F is the time-preference Nash solution.
3.2 Proof of Theorem 1
The idea of the proof is similar to the one applied by Grant and Kajii (1995).We ﬁrst deﬁne the
family of bargaining problems (in the sense of Nash (1950)) induced by the family of negotiation
problems we are dealing with.Next, for each negotiation solution we will deﬁne its associated
bargaining solution: a set valued function that maps bargaining solutions into a subset of its
feasible utilities set.Finally, we will show that if the negotiation solution satisﬁes the axioms of
the theorem, then the associated bargaining solution will satisfy some corresponding properties
which characterize the Nash bargaining solution.
13The following deﬁnitions are standard.A bargaining problem is a pair (S,d) where S ⊆ IR 2
is a compact, convex set, d ∈ S and there is s ∈ S with1 s   d.We denote by B the set of
all bargaining problems.Let ( S,d) be a bargaining problem.We say that s ∈ S is individually
rational if s ≥ d.We say that s ∈ S is weakly eﬃcient if there is no s  ∈ S such that s    s.
We denote by IR(S,d) the set of individually rational points in (S,d).A bargaining problem
(S,d)i sd-comprehensive if s ≥ s  ≥ d and s ∈ S, then s  ∈ S.A bargaining problem ( S,d)i s
symmetric if
• d1 = d2 and
• (s1,s 2) ∈ S implies (s2,s 1) ∈ S.
We say that (S ,d  ) is obtained from the bargaining problem (S,d) by the transformations si →
αisi + βi,f o ri =1 ,2, if d 
i = αidi + βi,f o ri =1 ,2a n d
S  = {(α1s1 + β1,α 2s2 + β2) ∈ IR 2 :( s1,s 2) ∈ S}.
Deﬁnition 4 Let B =  u,D  be a negotiation problem in N.The bargaining problem induced
by B is the bargaining problem  S,d  where
• d = u(D),
• S = {s ∈ IR : ∃x ∈X s.t. s = U((x))}.
Note that since B is a convex negotiation problem we can state the above conditions as
• d = u(D)
• S = u(X)
Lemma 3 Let B ∈Nbe a negotiation problem, its induced bargaining problem  S,d  is a
comprehensive bargaining problem with a point d0 ∈ S such that d0 ≤ s for all s ∈ S.
Proof :S i n c e X is a compact set and u is continuous, S(= u(X)), as the continuous image of
a compact set is compact.Since D ∈ X, d = u(D) ∈ u(X)=S.Since there is x ∈ X such that
u(x)   u(D), we have that there is s ∈ S such that s   d.Since u(d) ≤ u(x) for all x ∈ X,
d0 ≡ u(d) ≤ s for all s ∈ S.To show that S is convex let s,s  ∈ S.Then there exist x,x  ∈ X
such that
si = Ui(x)a n ds 
i = Ui(x ).
1We adopt the following conventions for vector inequalities: x   y ↔ xi >y i for all i,a n dx ≥ y ↔ xi ≥ yi for
all i.
14Let α ∈ (0,1).There is a time t ∈ T such that
αsi +( 1− α)s 
i = Ui([xtx ]).
By convexity of B we have that there exists z ∈ X such that z ∼ [xtx ] which implies that
αs+(1−α)s  ∈ S.It remains to show that  S,d  is comprehensive.But this follows immediately
from the assumptions of free disposal and convexity. ✷
Denote by S the set of all the cardinal problems induced by some convex negotiation problem
B ∈N.
Lemma 4 The class S is the class of all cardinal bargaining problems  S,d  that are compre-
hensive, and with a point d0 ∈ S with d0 ≤ s for all s ∈ S.
Proof : Given Lemma 3, it is enough to show that for every comprehensive bargaining problem
 S,d , with a point d0 ∈ S such that d0 ≤ s for all s ∈ S, there is a negotiation problem in N
that induces  S,d .So let B  =  (u 
1,u  
2),D  be a negotiation problem in N,a n dl e t S ,d    be
its induced cardinal problem.Without loss of generality we can assume that d  = d.For each
x ∈ X \{ D} deﬁne
λ (x)=m a x {λ ≥ 0:( 1− λ)u (D)+λu (x) ∈ S }
λ(x)=m a x {λ ≥ 0:( 1− λ)u (D)+λu (x) ∈ S}.
Since S  and S are compact sets, the above numbers are well-deﬁned.Further, since d is
an interior point of S ,w eh a v eλ (x) > 0.We can therefore deﬁne α(x)=λ(x)/λ (x) and the








It can be checked that u is continuous and that B =  (u1,u 2),D  is a negotiation problem that
induces S. ✷
Let F be a negotiation solution deﬁned on N that satisﬁes eﬃciency, symmetry, invariance, in-
dependence of non-individually rational outcomes, impatience monotonicity, and the tree-folding
property.Deﬁne the correspondence f : S→2IR
2
\∅by
f(S,d)={(u1(F(B)),u 2(F(B))) : ∃B =  (u1,u 2),D ∈N that induces  S,d }.
15Lemma 5 The correspondence f is the Nash bargaining solution.Namely, f is the singleton
{(s∗
1,s ∗
2)}⊆S such that (s∗
1 − d1)(s∗
2 − d2) ≥ (s1 − d1)(s2 − d2) for all (s1,s 2) ∈ S such that
si ≥ di for i =1 ,2.
Proof : It is enough to show that f satisﬁes all the properties that, according to the main
theorem in Dagan, Volij, and Winter (1999), characterize the Nash bargaining solution.These
properties are the following:
Invariance: Whenever (S ,d  ) is obtained from the bargaining problem (S,d) by means of the
transformations si → αisi + βi,f o ri =1 ,2, where αi > 0a n dβi ∈ I R ,w eh a v et h a t
fi(S ,d  )=αifi(S,d)+βi,f o ri =1 ,2.
Weak Pareto optimality: For all bargaining problems (S,d), f(S,d) is a subset of the weakly
eﬃcient points in S.
Symmetry: For all symmetric bargaining problems (S,d),
(s1,s 2) ∈ f(S,d) ⇔ (s2,s 1) ∈ f(S,d).
Single-valuedness in symmetric problems: For every symmetric problem B ∈B , f(B)i sa
singleton.
Twisting: Let (S,d) be a bargaining problem and let (ˆ s1, ˆ s2) ∈ f(S,d).Let ( S ,d) be another
bargaining problem such that for some agent i =1 ,2
S \ S  ⊆{ (s1,s 2):si > ˆ si}
S  \ S ⊆{ (s1,s 2):si < ˆ si}.
Then, there is (s 
1,s  
2) ∈ f(S ,d) such that s 
i ≤ ˆ si.
Disagreement point convexity: For every bargaining problem B =( S,d), for all s ∈ f(S,d)
and for every λ ∈ (0,1) we have s ∈ f(S,(1 − λ)d + λs).
Independence of non-individually rational alternatives: For every two problems (S,d)
and (S ,d) such that IR(S,d)=IR(S ,d)w eh a v ef(S,d)=f(S ,d).
The ﬁrst four properties are standard.The axioms of twisting and disagreement point con-
vexity were introduced, in its single-valued versions, by Thomson and Myerson (1980) and Peters
and van Damme (1991), respectively.Independence of non-individually rational alternatives is
ﬁrst discussed in Peters (1986).Now we turn to show that our correspondence f satisﬁes the
above properties.
16Invariance:L e t  S,d  be a bargaining problem in S and let s∗ ∈ f(S,d).Then there is a
negotiation problem B =  (u1,u 2),D ∈Nand an outcome x∗ ∈ X such that  S,d  is induced
by B and s∗ = u(F(B)).Let  S ,d    be a cardinal problem that is obtained from  S,d  by means
of the transformations si → αisi + βi,f o ri =1 ,2a n dαi > 0.Then, the negotiation problem
B  =  (α1u1+β1,α 2u2+β2),D  induces  S ,d  and since F satisﬁes invariance, still x∗ = F(B ).
Therefore (α1s1 + β1,α 2s2 + β2) ∈ f(S ,d  ).
Weak Pareto optimality: Let (s1,s 2) ∈ f(S).Then there is a negotiation problem B that
induces S such that si = ui(F(B)) for i =1 ,2.If there was ( s 
1,s  
2) ∈ S such that (s 
1,s  
2)  
(s1,s 2), then there would be y ∈ X such that s 
i = ui(y), for i =1 ,2a n dui(y) >u i(F(B)) for
i =1 ,2.This would contradict the fact that F is eﬃcient.
Symmetry and single-valuedness in symmetric problems: Let  S,d  be a symmetric
cardinal problem.Then there is a negotiation problem B =  u,D  that induces it, namely
S = u(X)a n dd = u(D).Let x ∈ X.Then ( s1,s 2)=( u1(x),u 2(x)) ∈ S.Since S is symmetric
there is y ∈ X such that (s2,s 1)=( u1(y),u 2(y)) ∈ S and, since B is assumed to be parsimonious,
this y is unique.Deﬁne φ(x)=y.We claim that φ is a symmetry function.To see this, note
that by deﬁnition of φ, φ(φ(x)) = x and φ(D)=D.Further,
U1([Dτz]) >U 1([Dτ z ]) ⇔ (1 − e−δτ)u1(D)+e−δτu1(x) > (1 − e−δτ
)u1(D)+e−δτ
u1(z )
⇔ (1 − e−δτ
))u2(D)+e−δτu2(φ(x)) > (1 − e−δτ
u2(D)+e−δτ
u2(φ(z ))
⇔ U2([Dτφ(z)]) >U 2([Dτ φ(z )]).
This means that B is a symmetric negotiation problem.By symmetry of F, φ(F(B)) = F(B).
We also have u2(x)=u1(φ(x)) for all x ∈ X.Therefore u2(F(B)) = u1(φ(F(B)) = u1(F(B)),
namely, the solution is on the 45 degree line.We can conclude then that f satisﬁes symmetry.
Further, since F is eﬃcient, u(F(B)) is the unique eﬃcient point in the 45 degree line which
means that f is single-valued for symmetric problems.
Disagreement point convexity:L e t S,d  be a bargaining problem, let s∗ ∈ f(S,d)a n dl e t
λ ∈ (0,1).We must show that s∗ ∈ f(S,(1−λ)d+λs∗).Since s∗ ∈ f(S,d), there is a negotiation
problem B =  u,D  that induces  S,d  and an outcome x∗ = F(B) such that s∗ = u(x∗).Since
λ ∈ (0,1), there is a time τ ∈ T such that λ = e−δτ.Since B is convex, there is an outcome
z ∈ X such that
u(z)=( 1 − λ)u(D)+λu(x∗)
=( 1 − λ)d + λs∗.
Therefore,  S,(1−λ)d+λs∗  is induced by  (u1,u 2),z .Since F satisﬁes the tree-folding property,
x∗ = F((u1,u 2),z)
17which implies that s∗ ∈ f(S,(1 − λ)d + λs∗).
Twisting: Let  S,d  be a bargaining problem and let (s∗
1,s ∗
2) ∈ f(S,d).Let  S ,d  be another
bargaining problem for which
S \ S  ⊆{ (s1,s 2) ∈ IR 2 : s1 >s ∗
1}
S  \ S ⊆{ (s1,s 2) ∈ IR 2 : s1 <s ∗
1}.
Note that s∗ ∈ S .We must show that there is ( s 
1,s  





f(S,d), there is a negotiation problem B =  (u1,u 2),D ∈Nand an outcome x∗ = F(B)
such that S is induced by B and (s∗
1,s ∗
2)=( u1(x∗),u 2(x∗)).We shall deﬁne utility functions
u 
1 and u 
2 such that B  =  (u 
1,u  
2),D  induces  S ,d .Let x ∈ X such that x  = D and let
s =( s1,s 2)=u(x).Consider the ray R(x)={λs ∈ IR 2 : λ ≥ 0} that begins at d and goes
through s and deﬁne the following three numbers:
λ(x)=m a x {λ ≥ 0:( 1− λ)d + λs ∈ S}




Since S and S  are compact sets and since d ∈ IntS ∩ IntS , the above numbers are well deﬁned
for all x.Further,
α(x) ≥ 1 ⇔ S ∩ R(x) ⊆ S  ∩ R(x).




ui(x)i f x = D
α(x)ui(x)i f x  = D.
It can be seen that with this utility functions, B  =  (u 
1,u  
2),D  induces S .Further,
1. ui(D)=u 
i(D)a n dui(x∗)=u 
i(x∗), for i =1 ,2
2.for all x ∈ X,i fx is eﬃcient and individually rational in B,s oi sx is eﬃcient in B 
3.for all eﬃcient and individually rational points x,y ∈ X, ui(x) ≥ ui(y) if and only if
u 
i(x) ≥ u 
i(y), for i =1 ,2
Let now x ∈ X and τ ∈ T such that
(1 − e−δτ)u1(D)+e−δτu1(x)=u1(x∗)( 7 )
18where x∗ is the outcome for which ui(x∗)=s∗
i,f o ri =1 ,2.Upon reﬂection one realizes that
α(x) ≤ 1 which implies
(1 − e−δτ)u 
1(D)+e−δτu 
1(x) ≤ u 
1(x∗).






(1 − e−δτ)u 
2(D)+e−δτu 
2(x∗) ≥ u 
2(x).
By IM of F we have u 
1(F(B)) ≥ u 
1(F(B )) and u 
2(F(B)) ≤ u 
2(F(B )).Therefore ( s1,s 2)=
u (F(B )) ∈ f(S ,d)w i t hs 
1 ≤ s∗
1, which is exactly what we wanted to prove.
Independence of non-individually ratioinal alternatives:L e t  S,d  and  S ,d  be two
bargaining problems such that
{s ∈ S : s ≥ d} = {s ∈ S  : s ≥ d}.
We want to show that f(S,d)=f(S ,d).Let s∗ =( s∗
1,s ∗
2) ∈ f(S,d).Then, there exists an ordinal
negotiation problem B =  (u1,u 2),D  and an outcome x∗ ∈ X such that B induces  S,d  and
s∗
i = ui(x∗)f o ri =1 ,2.Now build B  =  (u 
1,u  
2),D  as in the proof of twisting so that B  induces
 S ,d .It is clear that IR(B)=IR(B ) and that u and u  coincide on IR(B).Consequently, by
independence of non-individually rational outcomes of F we have that x∗ = F(B ).As a result,
s∗ ∈ f(S ,d). ✷
Since f si the Nash bargaining solution, we can conclude that F is the time preference
negotiation solution, and the proof is complete.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we provided a characterization of the time-preference Nash solution using, along
with some standard axioms, properties that are related to preferences over outcome streams.
The ordinal Nash solution introduced by Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson (1992) and the time-
preference Nash solution analyzed here are diﬀerent concepts.Although a primitive of both
models is an abstract set X of physical outcomes, the former solution needs preferences over
lotteries on X to be deﬁend, while the latter needs time-preferences to be deﬁned.Therefore the
two concepts are not comparable.On the other hand, since both solutions select an outcome
from the primitive set X, we can compare them when X itself consists of a set of lotteries.In
19this case, we’ve seen that both solutions may select diﬀerent outcomes, unless preferences satisfy
the expected utility axioms.Further, no assumptions on the within-periods risk preferences are
needed for the time-preference solution to exist.
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